INTRODUCTION
In 1991, fiscal decentralization started in earnest in the Philippines in 1991 with the passage of the Local Government Code. After more than 10 years into its implementation, now is opportune time to assess how the key features of this landmark legislation has contributed to (or detract from) achieving the balance between local autonomy and accountability.
It is clear from the literature on fiscal decentralization that these two goals are not incompatible. In fact, real autonomy (in the sense of subnational governments being able to link their spending decisions with their revenue/tax decisions) promotes fiscal responsibility. In the context of the ongoing debate in the Philippines, however, local autonomy has been equated (by LGUs officials) with the independence of LGUs from central government interference. As such, LGU officials have focused on securing even higher levels of block grants in order to address the widely perceived vertical fiscal imbalance. However, closer scrutiny of the problem indicates that greater tax decentralization coupled with a well designed fiscal equalization program would better enhance the gains that are forthcoming from the decentralization process while minimizing the risks of macro-instability.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
The Philippines has a unitary form of government with a multi-tiered structure. It is a presidential republic with a bi-cameral legislature. The central government operates through some 20 departments/agencies. Administratively, the country is divided into 15 administrative regions and most departments maintain regional offices. However, these regions (with the exception of the ARMM) are just administrative sub-divisions and not regional governments with elected regional officials.
The second tier of government is composed of local government units (LGUs) and one autonomous region, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In general, the local government structure is composed of three layers.
1 Provinces comprise the first layer. In turn, the province is divided into municipalities and component cities, each of which is further subdivided into barangays, the smallest political unit. At the same time, independent cities exist at the same level as the provinces, i.e., they share the same functions and authorities. However, independent cities are partitioned directly into barangays (Figure 1 ).
Each level of
LGU is headed by an elected chief executive (governor, mayor, or barangay captain) and has a legislative body or Sanggunian (composed of an elected vice-governor/ vice-mayor and council members). All elected officials have a three-year term of office and are subject to a three-term limit. To a large extent, each level of local government is autonomous although the higher level of government (e.g. province) exercises some degree of supervision over lower level governments (e.g., municipalities and component cities) in terms of budgeting and legislation. At present, the Philippines has a population of over 82 million living in 80 provinces, 115 cities, 1,495 municipalities and some 41,945 barangays. 2 The barangay is the smallest political unit and is typically composed of about 100-500 households or about 2,000 individuals. On the one hand, the averaged-size municipality has 33,940 residents; the averaged-size city has 223,599; and the averaged-size province has 762,498. On the other hand, the population size of municipalities varies from 223 (Dingalan, Palawan) to 467, 375 (Taguig, NCR) ; that of cities from 31,253 (Palayan, Nueva Ecija) to 2,173,831 (Quezon City); and that of provinces from 16,467 (Batanes) to 2,434,086 (Pangasinan).
The Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160) of 1991 and the Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao (Republic Act 6734) of 1989 3 jointly define central-local relations in the Philippines. On the one hand, the Organic Act for the Muslim Mindanao granted the regional government powers that were previously held by the central government. It provides for the ARMM's expanded share and automatic retention of national internal revenue taxes collected in the region, significant regional discretion in development planning, and the regional governments' primacy in the delivery of basic services and the utilization and management of natural resources.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code in 1991 (LGC or Code) is a landmark legislation that gave rise to a major shift in local governance. It consolidated and amended the Local Government Code of 1983, the Local Tax Code (Presidential It should be stressed that under Executive Order 5074 many health programs (like immunization, control of communicable diseases, provision of drugs and medicines to devolved facilities and operation of hospitals in the NCR) continue to be funded by the central government under the budget of the Department of Health (DOH). This implies that the central government budget for these activities was not devolved in the sense of being "disallowed" in the budget of the DOH in the post-devolution period. Similarly, the central government continues up to this day to allocate monies for the school building program (now called the Basic Education Facilities Fund) despite the fact that construction of school building is devolved to LGUs. This practice has serious implications on how the cost of devolved functions is reckoned which is an important first step in gauging the adequacy of the IRA.
Assessment
The extensive literature on fiscal decentralization emphasizes the key features of expenditure assignment that would enhance the likelihood of efficiency gains from fiscal decentralization: (1) appropriate assignment of expenditure responsibilities across levels of government, and (2) unambiguous and clear assignment of functions.
On the one hand, the assignment of functions to the different levels of government is guided by the decentralization theorem which states that "each public service should be provided by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographic area that would internalize the benefits and costs of such provision" (Oates 1972) . Essentially, this implies that the expenditure responsibilities whose benefits extend beyond subnational jurisdictions are best assigned to the central government while the provision of public goods and services whose benefits are confined within their own political boundaries should be assigned to LGUs. At the same time, stabilization and the redistributive functions of government are best assigned to the central government because local governments have limited capacity to affect macroeconomic conditions and because they would find it difficult to sustain independent redistribution programs. On the other hand, the lack of clarity in the assignment of expenditure responsibility does not only give rise to disputes amongst the different levels of governments but also tends to blur accountability across levels of local government (McLure and Martinez-Vasquez 2002) .
Consistency with decentralization theorem. This discussion that follows will focus on the assessment of expenditure assignment under the Local Government Code of 1991. The expenditure assignment under the Organic Act of the ARMM is tackled in Box 1.
Box 1. Assessment of Expenditure Assignment under the Organic Act of ARMM
A comparison of RA 6734 and RA 7160 shows that non-ARMM LGUs are treated on an almost equal footing as the regional government of ARMM in terms of expenditure assignment although the functions and responsibilities assigned to the regional government of ARMM are slightly broader than those given to non-ARMM LGUs. In particular, the regional government of the ARMM is charged with the provision of agrarian reform and education services, the promotion of employment and workers' welfare and the promotion of trade and industry while non-ARMM LGUs are not.
On the other hand, ARMM-LGUs and non-ARMM LGUs are treated asymmetrically in terms of the expenditure responsibilities that are assigned to them. This is so because the regional government of the ARMM has not devolved any of their functions to the LGUs within their jurisdiction even if RA 6734 allows them to do so. Thus, ARMM-LGUs are not responsible for any of the devolved activities that have been transferred to non-ARMM LGUs under the Local Government Code of 1991.
The devolution of expenditure responsibilities to local governments under the LGC has been found to be generally consistent with the decentralization theorem (Loehr and Manasan 1999) . The activities devolved are those that can be provided at low levels of government. Few of them have benefits that spillover outside the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU except perhaps those related to environmental management. However, the Code permits LGUs to group themselves and consolidate/ coordinate their efforts, services and resources for purposes that are commonly beneficial to them (Section 33). Thus, there are many cases when smaller LGUs join together to carry out specific responsibilities (like coastal resource management, solid waste management, water supply development and distribution) when economies of scale and/or externalities make such cooperative undertakings appropriate. This development has contributed to the emergence of metropolitan arrangements in many places around the country (Mercado and Manasan 1999).
One important exception to the application of the decentralization theorem in the Philippines is education. The primary responsibility for the provision of basic education rests with the central government although the construction and maintenance of school buildings is devolved to LGUs under the Local Government Code.
5
In contrast, basic education is administered by local governments in many countries. Three arguments are generally offered why primary education should be decentralized: (1) the provision of education services is spread out geographically; (2) smaller schools are generally found to provide higher quality education and (3) direct involvement of parents and the local community in schools is observed to be a beneficial determinant of school quality (Ahmad, Hewitt and Ruggiero 1997) . On the other hand, the decentralization of education finance tends to lead to large differences in the quality of educational services and many countries take steps to enforce minimum standards of access and quality even as they decentralize the delivery of education services.
Clarity in expenditure assignment. Section 17 (b) of the Local Government Code provides an explicit and clear delineation of functions across levels of governments except perhaps in the area of environment and natural resource management. 6 However, Section 17 (c) allows central government agencies to continue to implement devolved public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services provided these are funded by the national government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources." In line with this, Executive Order 53 mandates national government agencies (NGAs) to retain management control over all foreignassisted projects and/or nationally funded projects even if the same involve devolved activities. At the same time, the Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations failed to define the mechanism/s through which the central government can direct assistance to
LGUs under Section 17 (f) which allows the national government or the next higher level of local government unit to "provide or augment the basic services and facilities assigned 5 One of the reasons for not devolving education can be traced to the fact that teachers serve in the Board of Election Inspectors. That is, the teachers man the precincts during elections and play an important role in the counting of votes. During debate prior to the enactment of the Local Government Code, concerns were reportedly raised that devolving teachers could overly politicize elections at the local level. 6 To wit, the Code gives municipalities responsibility for the implementation of community-based forestry and watershed projects but allows the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to retain supervision and control over such projects.
to a lower level of local government unit when such services or facilities are not made available or, if made available, are inadequate to meet the requirements of its inhabitants".
Because many of the so-called devolved NGAs are made accountable for the overall outcome in their respective areas, they deem it their responsibility to direct LGU behavior in support of national objectives.
7 Thus, most of them tend to make full use of Section 17 (f) of the Code and EO 53 regarding augmentation (Loehr and Manasan 1999) . Gonzalez (1996) goes even further to say that the prevailing regulatory framework effectively permits the existence of a two-track delivery system, where both NGAs and
LGUs can initiate devolved activities. In effect, then, Section 17 (c) and (f) obfuscate what initially appears to be a clear cut assignment of expenditure responsibilities. Loehr and Manasan (1999) also point out that Congressmen are enamored by Section 17 (f) of the Code as it allows them easy access to pork barrel funds by the simple act of inserting a special provision in the General Appropriations Act which ordains that monies from such augmentation funds can only be released for "projects that are identified by members of Congress." Because of these incentives on the part of both national government agencies and Congress to retain funding and implementation of devolved activities at the center, the budgets of devolved central government agencies grew disproportionately relative to the IRA. In particular, the IRA grew by 15 percent yearly on the average between 1994-1997 while the budget of the Department of Agriculture expanded by 48 percent, that of the Department of Health by 25 percent, and that of the Department of Social Welfare and Development by 22 percent. Along this line, Capuno et al. (2001) estimate that central government agencies (specifically, the DepEd, DOH, DPWH and DILG) spend significant amounts on devolved activities in 1995-1999 (Table 3) . Table 1a, Table 1b, table 1c, Table 1d and Table 1e Still a continuing source of irritant between the central government and
LGUs' is the propensity of the central government to pass on so-called unfunded mandates to
LGUs. The most important of these unfunded mandates refer to the implementation of the salary standardization law and the provision of additional benefits to health workers under the Magna Carta for Health Workers.
LGUs are also expected to provide budgetary support (either in the form of additional personnel benefits or outlays for MOOE) to many central government agencies operating at the local level like the police, fire protection bureau, and local courts.
Trend and Composition of LGU Expenditures, 1991-2001
Central-local expenditure distribution. Consistent with the devolution program, total LGU expenditure doubled relative to GNP and relative to total general government expenditure. Total
LGU spending increased from an average of 1. 6% of GNP in 1985 -1991 to 3.1% of GNP in 1992 -2001 . Similarly, the share of LGUs in total general government expenditure net of debt service rose from an average of 11.0% in the pre-Code period to an average of 22.2% in the post-Code period (Table  4) . Meanwhile, Table 5 documents the changing distribution of government spending on various sectors across different levels of government over time. It confirms that many devolved functions continue to be shared by the LGUs with the central government in a significant way. However, in line with the transfer of functions to LGUs mandated under the Local Government Code, the share of local governments in the aggregate in total general government spending net of debt service doubled from 12.6% in 1991 to 25.6% in 2001. In particular, the subnational government share in general government spending registered substantial increases in the areas of housing and community development (from 33% in 1991 to 81% in 2001) , health (from 10% to 56%), other economic services (from 57% to 91%), water resource development and flood control (from 13% to 49%), agriculture (from 3% to 16%), power and energy (from 4% to 14%), environment and natural resource management (from 0% to 10%), and education (from 2% to 8%). It is remarkable, however, that the share of LGUs in total general government spending on social welfare and labor and employment sector has not changed much (from 11% in 1991 to 12% in 2001) despite the transfer of about 60% of pre-devolution DSWD personnel to LGUs. The same is true of the transportation and communication sector where the share of LGUs has grown only minimally (from 15% to 17%) although the Local Government Code calls for the devolution of the construction and maintenance of all local infrastructure facilities and the provision of local telecommunication services to
LGUs. Distribution of LGU spending across levels of local government. In 1991, prior to the implementation of the Local Government Code, provinces contribute 29.0%, municipalities 40.1% and cities 30.9% of total local government expenditure ( Table 6) .
On the other hand, under the devolution program, provinces absorbed 45.6%, municipalities 47.4%, cities 7.0% of the total cost of functions devolved to said levels of government ( Table 7) . Given the relative importance of the provincial and municipal levels in terms of both pre-Code spending levels and the cost of devolved functions, the dramatic expansion in the share of cities and the corresponding contraction in the share of provinces and municipalities in total LGU expenditure in the post-Code period is rather unexpected and is perhaps best explained by the distribution of revenue across levels of local government in the post-Code period. Moreover, this trend appears to have gained in intensity over time. Thus, while the share of cities in total expenditure of all LGUs in the aggregate rose from 37.8% in 1995 to 41.3% in 2001, the share of municipalities declined from 37.6% to 34.8% and that of provinces dipped from 24.6% to 23.9%. The share of provinces and municipalities in total LGU spending on the economic services sector contracted from 35.4% and 33.7%, respectively, in 1991 to 27.6% and 30.2%, respectively, in 2001 while the share of cities expanded from 30.9% to 42.3%. This development is largely driven by the growing share of cities in total LGU spending on the transportation/ communication sub-sector in the post-Code period. Said movement dominates the expansion in the share of provinces in total LGU spending on the environment/ natural resource management sub-sector and the increase in the share of municipalities in total LGU spending on the agriculture and the water resource development sub-sectors.
Similarly, the share of provinces in total LGU spending on the social services sector declined from 33.5% in 1991 to 27.7% in 2001 despite the absorption of a large number of personnel in the health sub-sector by provinces and corresponding dramatic rise in the share of provinces in total LGU spending on the said sub-sector as the share of provinces in total LGU spending on social welfare and housing/ community development sub-sectors slipped in the post-Code period. In contrast, the share of municipalities and cities in total LGU expenditure on the social services sector rose from 24. 2% and 42.4%, respectively, in 1991 to 26.8% and 45.5%, respectively, in 2001 . The movement is due to the higher share of municipalities in total LGU spending on the health, social welfare and housing/ community development sub-sectors and the higher share of cities in total LGU spending on the housing/ community development and education sub-sectors in the postCode period. LGU spending on all sectors also posted increases when expressed relative to GNP. Thus, LGU spending on the social services sector grew from 0.3% of GNP in 1991 to 1.0% of GNP in 2001. Meanwhile, LGU allocation on the general public services sector increased from 0.8% to 1.5%. In contrast, LGU spending on the economic services sector expanded only minimally, from 0.7% to 0.9%. Table 2 The mandated transfer to LGUs of functions previously discharged by national government agencies caused a major shift in the size and composition of LGU budgets. Amongst the major sectors, the social services sector posted the fastest rate of growth in 1991-2001, increasing by 10.8% yearly on the average during the period compared to the overall growth in total LGU spending of 8.2%. In contrast, the general public services sector and the economic services sector grew at a slower pace (respectively, by 7.8% and 6.4% yearly on the average). Consequently, the share of the social services sector to total LGU expenditure expanded from 20.5% in 1985-1991 to 26.7% in 1993-2001 while that of the general public services sector and the economic services sector contracted, respectively, from 32.9% to 25.4% and from 42.8% to 39.9% ( Table 9 ).
The increase in LGU spending on social services between 1991 and 2001 went to health, education, housing/ community development and social welfare, in that order. Thus, aggregate LGU expenditure on health quintupled from 0.08% of GNP in 1991 to 0.43% of GNP in 2001 while LGU spending on education rose four-fold from 0.07% of GNP to 0.28% of GNP (Table 8 ). In contrast, total LGU expenditure on housing/ community development and social welfare services in 2001 were about twice as large their 1991 levels when expressed relative to GNP.
On the one hand, the hefty increases in LGU spending on health and social welfare were largely due to the fact that the LGUs had very little discretion but to absorbed the cost of devolved health and social welfare personnel which accounted for more than half of the total cost of all devolved personnel. On the other hand, higher LGU expenditures on education and housing/ community in the post-Code period largely reflect the higher priority that local officials assign to these sectors in the more decentralized regime since LGUs were not locked into previously set (i.e., predevolution) central government expenditure levels in these sectors precisely because
LGUs did not have to absorb devolved personnel. Aggregate LGU spending on the social services sector registered a general upward trend in 1991-2001 when measured relative to GNP and in real per capita terms. However, some stagnation (especially with respect to health expenditures) is evident in 1998-2001 when either of these measures are used ( Table 8 and Table 10 ). These movements are common across all levels of local government and appear to be related to the fiscal difficulties faced by LGUs during this period.
8 This may be a cause of concern considering that provinces and municipalities are primarily responsible for the delivery of basic health services. It highlights the importance for designing a grant program aimed at ensuring that LGUs provide education and health services that are consistent with minimum standard levels of access and quality.
On the other hand, the transportation/ communication sub-sector bear the brunt of the contraction in the budget share of the economic services sector. With the devolution of agricultural extension and environment/ natural resource management, the expenditure share of these sub-sectors rose somewhat between 1991 and 2001. In contrast, the share of the transportation communication sub-sector in total LGU expenditure dipped from 26.9% in 1991 to 10.2% in 2001 ( Table 9) .
Although aggregate LGU spending on transportation/ communication was fairly stable at 0.4% of GNP in the post-Code period, this situation conceals variations across the different levels of local government.
The expenditures on transportation/ communication sub-sector of provincial and municipal governments (when measured relative not only to total LGU spending but also to GNP) has been on a downtrend since 1997 (Annex Table 1 ). However, the opposite is true in the case of cities. Table 4 These developments appear to be link to the mismatch in the distribution of resources and expenditure responsibilities across levels of local governments. At the same time, these movements are a cause of concern considering the robust and strong association between economic growth and infrastructure spending. Given that the Code assigns the primary responsibility for the construction and maintenance of local infrastructure to local governments, this trend also points to the increasing disparity in economic development across levels of local government. It likewise underscores the importance of creating a suitable regulatory framework for encouraging private sector participation in infrastructure (through BOT and joint ventures) at the local level as well as the need for an appropriate grants program for LGU capital investments.
Distribution of
LGU expenditure by economic category. In the aggregate, LGU spending on personal services (PS) grew from an average of 0.7% of GNP in 1985-1991 to an average of 1.6% of GNP in 1992-2001 (Table 11) . Because it has grown at the same pace as total LGU expenditures, its share in total LGU spending has remained fairly stable at 47% in the pre-Code period as well as the post-Code period, making it the most important expenditure item according to economic category (Table 12) . The salary structure applicable to mandatory LGU positions is set by the Compensation and Position Classification Act (CPCA) of 1989. The CPCA in tandem with the Codal provisions on mandatory positions tend to restrict LGUs' ability to realign their outlays for personal services in consonance with their specific needs and circumstances. In some cases, these restrictions impose a heavy fiscal burden on LGUs (particularly in the case of provinces and municipalities), and thus, effectively putting a squeeze on ability of these LGUs' to fund maintenance and capital outlays. In other cases, they make it difficult for low income class LGUs to retain personnel, particularly in the health sector.
Although the Local Government Code imposes a ceiling on PS spending of LGUs (45%-55% of total regular income depending on LGU's income class), many exemptions are allowed in reckoning compliance to this mandate. Thus, aggregate LGU spending on personal services was, on the average, 56.8% of total LGU regular income in the previous year in 1992-2001 (Table 12) . Moreover, the situation is particularly problematic in the case of municipalities which posted an aggregate PS ratio of 64.4% on the average during the same period. Furthermore, personal services expenditure as recorded in the financial statements of LGUs tends to underestimate the amounts that LGUs actually spend on compensation of personnel because of the practice of charging the salaries and wages of contractual employees hired under so-called "job orders" or "service contracts" against MOOE or CO (for development projects). Some LGUs (e.g., Aklan and Kalibo) report that this practice is no longer allowed under new government accounting system (NGAS) but other sample
LGUs report that this practice is still in effect. For instance, a number of the LGUs report that 15%-20% of their MOOE is actually used to pay for contractual personnel. Still other LGUs charge some of their "excess" personal services against the accounts of public enterprises like public markets.
On the other hand, the share of capital outlays (CO) in aggregate LGU expenditures expanded from an average of 16.4% in 1985-1991 to an average of 18.9% in 1992-2001 . This came at the expense of maintenance and other operating expenditures whose share contracted from 37.1% to 34.2%. This development is largely driven by the dramatic growth in the capital outlays of cities.
However, there is a squeeze not only on MOOE but also on capital outlays in the case of municipalities and provinces in the post-Code period. Thus, the share of MOOE in total LGU spending contracted from 39.2% in 1985-1991 to 31.1% in 1992-2001 in the case of municipalities and from 36.9% to 24.7% in the case of provinces. Similarly, the share of capital outlays in total LGU spending declined from 14.9% to 13.6% in the case of municipalities and from 18.9% to 16.9% in the case of provinces.
Thus, the share of capital outlays (CO) in total LGU expenditures of all LGUs combined expanded from an average of 16.4% in 1985-1991 to an average of 18.9% in 1992-2001 . This came at the expense of maintenance and other operating expenditures whose share contracted from 37.1% to 34.2% (Table 11) . Nonetheless, because the LGU expenditure pie has grown bigger relative to GNP, aggregate LGU spending on capital outlays increased from an average of 0.3% of GNP in the pre-Code period to an average of 0.7% of GNP in the post-Code period while aggregate LGU MOOE rose from 0.6% of GNP to 1.2% of GNP (Table 12 ).
REVENUE ASSIGNMENT AND DISTRIBUTION

Legal Framework
The discussion that follows refers to the tax assignment under the Local Government Code. Tax assignment in the ARMM is taken up in Box 2.
Box 2. Tax Assignment in ARMM
Under RA 6733, the regional government of the ARMM was authorized to levy all types of taxes with the exception of the income tax and customs duties. In practice, however, the regional government of the ARMM does not touch any of the taxes that the central government levies. Instead, it has chosen to impose a supplementary rate (i.e., a surcharge) on taxes that are typically levied by provincial governments under the Local Government Code like the real property tax, the sand and gravel tax, the amusement tax, the professional tax, and the franchise tax.* In this sense, the amended Organic Act of the ARMM (Republic Act 9054) simply formalizes the symmetrical treatment of the ARMM and the LGUs with regards to the limitations on their taxing powers.
* In practice, the regional government of ARMM imposes tax rates that are 60%-90% lower than those of the LGUs'. and barangays in the case of the province and barangays in the case of the city). In addition, both provinces and cities are also allowed to impose a tax on the transfer of real property, on sand, gravel and other quarry resources, on amusement places, on franchises, on professionals, on delivery vans and trucks, and on idle lands. 9 Meanwhile, municipalities and cities (but not provinces) are authorized to levy the community tax and the local business tax (basically a turnover tax that is levied on the gross receipts of businesses/ traders). On the other hand, Section 133 of the LGC lists in some detail the taxes that
LGUs are not allowed touch and which are reserved for the central government. This includes: the income tax (both individual and corporate), customs duties, the value added tax, and excise taxes on alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and petroleum products are reserved for the central government alone. At the same time, the National Internal Revenue Code does not provide for a central government real property tax nor for a central government community tax (poll tax).
The Local Government Code does not only define the base of each of these taxes. It also sets limits (i.e., floors and/or ceilings) on the tax rates that LGUs may impose, although LGUs do have some discretion over tax rates. In general, cities are maximum allowable tax rates applicable to cities are higher than those applicable to provinces/ municipalities.
Compared to the Presidential Decree (PD) 231 and Presidential Decree 464 (which defined the taxing powers of LGUs prior to the enactment of the Code), RA 7160 expanded the tax base of LGUs to include products, activities and sectors (like banks and other financial institutions, and printing/publication) that used to be outside the reach of local taxation. It also increased the maximum allowable rates at which most local taxes may be levied.
10 However, the Code effectively reduced the assessment levels (for purposes of real property taxation) of residential land, all types of buildings and all types of machinery. Also, the Code provided for the exemption of residential buildings with market value below P175,000 from real property taxation. Meanwhile, the Local Government Code has liberalized the LGUs' scope for the collection of user charges.
Assessment
The traditional literature on fiscal federalism (e.g., Shah 1994 , Ter-Minassian 1997 , Bird 1999 ) provides three general criteria in assessing the appropriateness of tax assignment: economic efficiency, equity and administrative feasibility. The economic efficiency criterion suggests that each level of government should be assigned taxes that related to the benefits of its spending responsibility. Thus, user charges for identifiable public services that are provided by subnational governments and taxes that are levied based on the benefit principle (e.g., motor vehicle taxes and fuel taxes which may be use to finance the construction and finance of local infrastructure) are best assigned to LGUs. To the extent that LGUs have to resort to non-benefit taxation, they should tax bases which have low inter-jurisdictional mobility. Otherwise, non-uniform tax rates levied by different LGUs will distort the geographic allocation of economic resources.
At the same time, it is argued that progressive taxes (i.e., those that are based on ability to pay) should finance the redistributive function of government. And, because the said function is generally viewed as a central government function, progressive taxes are best assigned to the central government. Lastly, the concern for administrative efficiency indicates that the authority to collect particular types of taxes should be given to the level of government that is able to do so with the lowest possible collection and enforcement cost.
On the other hand, the new view on tax assignment (e.g., Mc Lure 1999, Bird 1999) emphasizes the need to provide subnational governments with fiscal autonomy. Here, what is important is (1) for LGUs governments to have their own source of revenues and (2) for LGUs to have the power to control the amount of revenues they receive at the margin so as to be able to fund the level of services they prefer.
11 In this way, "subnational governments would have to face the full marginal tax price of the spending decisions for which they are responsible" (Bird 1999) .
Given this background, the Philippine tax assignment appears to largely be consistent with the conventional wisdom. The two most important sources of tax revenue for LGUs, the real property tax and the community tax, are taxes on immobile factors. At the same time, LGUs are given wide latitude on the amount of fees and other user charges they may levy.
However, the current tax assignment scores low in terms of the autonomy criterion. While the Local Government Code authorizes LGUs to levy a good number of taxes, it also seriously limits their power to set local tax rates. One, the Code fixes the tax rate for some types of taxes like the SEF real property tax rate, the community tax. Two, even for those taxes over which LGUs have some discretion in setting tax rates, the maximum allowable rates appears to be too low. For instance, to date, all provinces impose the maximum allowable basic real property tax rate. Three, the Code mandates that tax rates can only be adjusted once in 5 years and by no more than 10%. This provision is particularly restrictive in the case of taxes (like the professional tax and the tax on delivery vans and trucks) whose rates are specified in nominal peso terms. Clearly, the resulting adjustments will not allow LGUs to maintain the real value of their revenues.
At the same time, the discussion below shows that there is a mismatch between the assignment of taxes and the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to the different levels of local government. The share of provinces and municipalities in total LGU ownsource revenue declines in the post-Code period despite their large share in the cost of devolved functions. Many local tax experts suggest that future Code amendments should look at giving LGUs greater discretion in setting tax rates by raising the maximum allowable tax rates. Moreover, there is a need to move away from tax rates that are not indexed to inflation as such practice necessitate frequent revisions of local tax ordinances if LGUs want to keep their own-source revenues buoyant. Also, the tax structure prescribed by the Code for the local business tax is too complicated such that different categories of firms are subject to different rate schedules. This situation tends to increase administrative and compliance costs and further strains the capacity of an already weak local tax administration (Taliercio 2003).
Related to this, tax administration is severely inadequate in many LGUs. This is illustrated dramatically by the collection efficiency for the real property tax ( Table 14) . Many of the personnel assigned to the tax division are not well-equipped technically for their tasks. Very few of these units have certified public accountants in their rolls, thereby impairing their audit capability. Also, not many LGUs have computers that will help them improve their revenue performance.
Finally, many LGU officials tend not to fully utilize the tax powers assigned to them. For instance, many provinces and cities have done a general revision of the schedule of market values only once since 1991, resulting in declining collections in real terms and under-collection from inaccurate assessment.
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This development is reportedly due to resistance on the part of either the local chief executive or the local Sanggunian (or both) to increase the tax rates in general for fear of a backlash from their constituents during election. (Table 15) . Moreover, local government revenue effort rose only marginally from an average of 0.8% of GNP in the pre-Code period to and average of 1.2% of GNP in the post-Code period (Table 16 ). Distribution of LGU own-source revenue across levels of local government. The assignment of revenues under the Local Government Code has effectively shifted the distribution of own-source revenue from municipalities and provinces in favor of cities. Note that the Code not only allows cities to impose all the taxes that provinces and municipalities are authorized to levy, it also gives them a greater discretion in setting the tax rates. Also, the share of the province and the municipality in the proceeds of the real property tax was reduced by the LGC relative to PD 464.
Thus, the share of provinces and municipalities in total LGU own-source revenue contracted from an average of 19. 9% and 37.1%, respectively, in 1985-1991 to 13.2% and 29.0%, respectively, in 1992-2001 (Table 17) . This kind of movement is evident for tax as well as non-tax sources of own-source revenues. Comparing with Table 17 with  Table 7 , the inconsistency between tax assignment and expenditure assignment becomes evident.
Distribution of LGU own-source revenues by type. For all
LGUs in the aggregate, tax revenues is the major source of own-source revenue, accounting for 66.3% of their total own-source revenue in 1985-1991 and 74.9% in 1992-2001 (Table 18 ). While revenues from the real property tax are more important than those from other taxes for all provinces in the aggregate in the post-Code period, the opposite is true in the case of municipalities. In comparison, tax revenues of all cities combined are divided almost equally between real property tax and other taxes during the same period. Moreover, the increase in the share of other taxes in total own-source revenue of cities and municipalities is remarkable in the post-Code period. Real property tax effort for all LGUs in the aggregate show some stagnation in the second half of the 1990s (Table 19 ). This trend is more pronounced in the case of provinces and municipalities and may be linked to the technical as well as political difficulties in the administration of the RPT.
When measured relative to GNP, total own-source revenue of provinces registered a contraction in the post-Code period, from an average of 0.08% of GNP in 1985 GNP in -1991 GNP in to 0.10% in 1992 GNP in -2001 (Table 19) . This is primarily traceable to a decline in their non-tax revenue (particularly operating and other miscellaneous income). The decline in non-tax effort of provinces is surprising given the greater autonomy that LGUS enjoy in the setting fees and user charges. In contrast, total own-source revenue effort of cities and municipalities rose from an average of 0.35% and 0.30% of GNP, respectively, in 1985-1991 to 0.68% and 0.34% of GNP, respectively, in 1992 GNP, respectively, in -2001 (Table 19) . In cities, all sources of own-source revenues increased in the post-Code period but the improvement in local tax effort (both RPT and other taxes) was dramatic. On the other hand, the expansion in the own-source revenue effort of municipalities was largely driven by increases in their other taxes and in their operating/ miscellaneous revenues. These differences in the revenue performance of provinces, cities and municipalities maybe explained by differences in their tax bases as well as differences in their taxing powers. Being more urbanized and having economies that are more market-based, the tax base of cities tends to be more buoyant when compared to those of municipalities and provinces.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
Legal Framework
In the Philippines, central government transfers to sub-national governments are of two types: formula based block grants (i.e., internal revenue allotment or IRA and share in national wealth) and ad hoc categorical grants. In principle, LGUs have almost full discretion in the utilization of their IRA. In contrast, the categorical grants are conditioned on their use for specific purposes.
Internal revenue allotment. While
LGUs receive a fixed share of central government tax revenues (IRA) on the basis of a formula fixed by law, the ARMM's share is based on the origin principle. Specifically, said share of subnational governments in internal revenue taxes is transferred as a block grant and, as such, both the regional government of the ARMM and the LGUs enjoy considerable discretion in its utilization.
The IRA is allocated to the different levels of local government and to specific
LGUs within each level according to a pre-determined formula that is based on population, land area and equal sharing. Under the Local Government Code, the aggregate IRA of LGUs is set at 40 percent of actual internal revenue tax collections of the central government three years prior to the current year.
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Under the Code, the IRA is divided amongst the different levels of local government as follows: 23 percent to provinces, 23 percent to cities, 34 percent to municipalities and 20 percent to barangays.
14 In turn, the IRA share of each tier of local government is then apportioned to individual LGUs on the basis of population (50 percent), land area (25 percent) and equal sharing (25 percent). 15 Meanwhile, actual collections of internal revenue taxes in the ARMM area are divided as follows: 30 percent to the central government, 35 percent to the regional government itself and 35 percent to the local governments in the region (distributed to each one of them according to the derivation principle). 16 The collecting agent (in this 13 In comparison, the share of LGUs in national taxes was equal to 20 percent of internal revenue taxes at the maximum in the pre-Code regime. The amount of IRA that was actually appropriated in the pre-Code era was 13% of net BIR tax receipts on the average in 1987-1990. 14 Prior to the implementation of the Code, the inter-tier allocation of the IRA was: 27 percent to provinces, 22 percent to cities, 41 percent to municipalities and 10 percent to barangays. 15 In the pre-Code period, the intra-tier allocation to individual LGUs was determined as follows: 70 percent on the basis of population, 20 percent based on land area, and 10 percent based on equal sharing. 16 Prior to the amendment of the organic act of the ARMM in 2001, the share of the central government was 40%, that of the regional government was 30% and that of the province or city was 30%.
case the regional office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue) automatically remits to the regional government the latter's share of the regional government together with those of its constituent LGUs. Thus, LGUs in the ARMM are not only entitled to their share under the Local Government Code but also to their share under the organic act of ARMM.
On the other hand, while the Local Government Code provides for the automatic release of the IRA, the IRA has emerged to be a highly unpredictable source of financing for LGUs since 1998 given the severe fiscal constraints faced by central government (Table 20) . For instance, in 1998, 5% of the IRA was not released to LGUs on the basis of a fiscal austerity measure implemented by the DBM. 17 A case questioning the legality of the central government's action in this regard was brought to the Supreme Court which subsequently ruled in favor of LGUs.
In 2000, Congress lopped off P10 billion from the mandated IRA share of
LGUs and set aside the said amount under Unpro-grammed Funds (i.e., appropriations that will only be released when revenues in excess of targets are realized). In that year, DBM also went through the ruse of requiring the submission of LGUs' Annual Investment Plan prior to releasing 20% of the IRA of individual LGUs in an attempt to delay the release of the IRA so as to reduce the central government's fiscal deficit.
In 2001, when the government had to operate on the basis of the previous year's appropriations because of the failure of Congress to enact a new GAA on time, the DBM initially set aside P121.8 billion for the IRA (the full amount including the unprogrammed portion that was appropriated under the 2000 GAA). Just the same, this is P10 billion short of the 40% share in internal revenue taxes that is mandated under the Local Government Code. In the end, the DBM actually obligated P115.8 billion only.
Categorical grants. Categorical grants to
LGUs may come from various sources: (1) lump sum allocations for the same under the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of various years, (2) allocations made by central government sector agencies from their own a/ P10 billion of the P121.8 billion mandated share was put under "unprogrammed funds" by a member of the Senate. b/ in the course of the budget year, P2.5 billion was transferred from the "unprogrammed fund" to the "programmed" portion of budget budgets, and (3) lump sum and/or line item appropriations for pork barrel funds of legislators.
In the 1998 and 1999 GAA, for instance, there are three major lump sum funds that finance the implementation of devolved activities supportive of major national government programs. These are the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF), the Local Government Empowerment Fund (LGEF), and the Municipal Development Fund (MDF).
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The principal difference amongst these funds stems from (1) the nature of the fund transfers and (2) the agencies that administers them. Both the LGEF and the LGSEF are comprised exclusively of grant funds. In contrast, the MDF includes funds for both loans and grants.
The LGSEF was created by Executive Order 48 of 1998 and, consequently, the 1999 and the 2000 GAA earmarked P5 billion that was carved out of he aggregate IRA share of LGUs. The LGSEF was originally designed to provide equalization grants to
LGUs.
19 However, many
LGUs officials resent the fact that the money for the LGSEF was taken from the IRA -thus, diminishing what they interpret to be theirs as a matter of entitlement. Because of this, the LGSEF has been short-lived.
On the other hand, the LGEF provides budget cover for foreign-assisted projects supportive of major national government programs in the 21 priority provinces and in 5 In addition to the LGSEF and the LGEF, many sector agencies implement matching grants programs out of their own GAA budgets. These programs are aimed at encouraging LGUs to fund and to undertake activities that are supportive of national programs and objectives. The Matching Grants Program of the DOH for the promotion of family planning is an example. Generally, LGUs have to apply for the grant and, if they qualify, are required to open a special bank account that will be used for the purpose of tracking and implementing the grant funds and the LGU counterpart.
Initially, many
LGUs did not encounter difficulties in providing counterpart funding support to ODA-assisted and/or NG-assisted projects. This situation appears to be changing. The reason lies in the convergence of a number of these projects in the same LGUs, thus, putting a strain on the absorptive capacity of said LGUs. Moreover, the SRA provinces which are targeted by many of these projects are inherently less capable financially to start with.
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The rationale for the continued involvement of central government agencies in devolved activities has to be revisited. While this issue appears to have waned given the current fiscal difficulties faced by the government, it is one that is likely to recur when the fiscal position of the central government improves. 21 On the one hand, there appears to be some justification for matching grants in cases of activities that have significant benefit spillovers across LGU jurisdictions since LGUs would tend to under-provide these services without national government grants. On the other hand, there is a need to evaluate these expenditures in the context of possible turf-maximization behavior on the part of national agency bureaucrats.
In contrast, the MDF is a facility for channeling the proceeds of various loans that the central government has obtained from foreign governments and multilateral institutions. Official development assistance (ODA) funds intended for LGUs are first appropriated and allotted to the MDF. The MDF then release said funds in the form of either loans and/or grants to LGUs. The MDF prescribes a loan/ equity/ grant mix in the financing of varying types of LGU projects depending on the income type of the LGU concerned. For instance, LGUs of whatever class are not entitled to grants for revenue generating projects. On the other hand, grants are made available for projects with social and environment objectives with the grant share of lower income LGUs being larger than that of higher income LGUs and, correspondingly, the equity share and the loan share of less-well-off LGUs being smaller than those of their better-off LGUs.
One of the issues relating to the current operation of the MDF is the need to unbundle grants from loans. It is argued that decisions involving the grant system should be isolated from the credit system. An LGU which has access to a grant should not be automatically be given access to a loan, and vice versa. This is so because the reasons for providing grants are quite different and independent for the reasons for giving credit. Grants to LGUs are typically justified on economic efficiency (e.g., existence of externalities) and equity grounds while the decision to grant an LGU a loan depends on its creditworthiness. Unbundling does not mean that an LGU cannot access both sources of financing at the same time. What is critical, here, is the separate and independent evaluation of the grant and the loan application of LGUs.
The present system (by prescribing a loan-equity-grant mix for various types of projects) effectively results in a subsidized credit program even if the credit component is priced at market rates of interest. In turn, such a situation tends to promote continued LGU dependence on subsidized credit while easing out private capital in the LGU credit market (Llanto et al. 1998 ). There has been some attempt to move the administration of all central government grant transfers to LGUs to another agency outside of the MDFO (e.g., DBM, the DOF after the latter has shed off the MDFO, or the MDFO itself if it spins off its credit function) but concerns about turf muddled up concerns about grant policy and the proposal was shelved. 
Size and Composition of Central Government Transfers to
With the implementation of the Local Government Code, there has been a remarkable increase in the size of central government transfers to LGUs as well as a palpable shift in their composition. On the one hand, central government transfers to
LGUs surged from 6.4% of national government revenues (or 5.5% of national government expenditures) in the pre-Code period to 16.5% of national government revenues (or 14.5% of national government expenditures) in the post-Code period (Table  21 ). This development has been a source of increasing pressure on national government expenditures in recent years.
On the other hand, there has been a movement away from ad hoc grants in favor of formula-based block grants in the post-Code period. In particular, the share of the IRA in total central government transfers to LGUs rose from 76% in 1985-1991 to 99% in 1992-2001 while the share of ad hoc grants declined from 24% to 1%.
Thus, while the hefty increase in the IRA relative to LGU revenues and LGU expenditures following the implementation of the Code is well known, it is not always fully appreciated that the total central government transfers did not increase by as much in the post-Code period (Table 22) . This occurred as ad hoc grants declined to less than 1% of total LGU revenue in 1992-2001 from 13.6% in 1985-1991. These developments affirm the thrusts towards increased local autonomy under the Local Government Code. 22 Refer to the ADB-DBM Technical Assistance on the creation of a LGU Development Fund. 
Consistency of Revenue and Expenditure Assignment across Levels of Local Government
As is the case in other countries, there is a mismatch between revenue means and expenditures needs of various levels of local government in the Philippines. Many types of taxes are either easier to administer at the central level or are deemed to be unsuitable for local sub-national government imposition because their tax bases are geographically mobile. On the other hand, the principle of subsidiarity implies that many functions are best assigned to local governments. In this context, intergovernmental transfers are generally viewed as an instrument that may be used to correct for the imbalance in the tax and expenditure assignment.
Vertical balance in the ARMM. RA 6734 as amended and the Local Government Code, in combination, has resulted in a severe vertical fiscal imbalance in the ARMM as there has been a mismatch between the expenditure responsibilities that were transferred and the revenue means of the subnational government. On the one hand, the regional government's share in internal revenue taxes is not sufficient to cover the expenditure responsibilities assigned to it. In particular, the share of the regional government in internal revenue taxes is only equivalent to about 3 percent of the cost of the devolved functions. This occurs largely because the ARMM's share in national taxes is computed on a derivation basis (i.e., where the tax is actually collected). But precisely because the ARMM is a less developed region, its tax base is lower than the average tax base for the country in its entirety. However, the problem also partly stems from the fact that all of the responsibilities devolved by the central government are shifted to the regional government, with none being assigned to the LGUs in the area despite the fact that RA 6734 allows the regional government to devolved their functions to the LGUs.
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As a result, the regional government of ARMM is dependent on yearly allocations from the central government's general appropriations to carry out its mandate. The regional government has very little control over the size and the composition of this funding. To wit, the size of this direct funding support is entirely dependent on the central government and the ARMM competes for these resources just like other central government agencies. Also, the allocation of the said transfers to various uses is predetermined by the central government as these uses are represented by line items in the General Appropriations Act. As such, the regional government is reduced to an administrative arm of the central government -simply implementing the latter's plans and programs.
It should be pointed out that since 1992 central government transfers to the regional government has grown at a faster pace than what would have been necessary if one were simply making adjustments for inflation and population growth. In fact, central government allotment for the ARMM's regular operations is about than twice the amount that what it used to spend in the region. Perhaps this was the central government's way of making up for its negligence of the region's needs in the past.
On the other hand, ARMM LGUs get the resources but not the expenditure responsibilities.
LGUs in the ARMM are entitled not only to their IRA share as provided by the Local Government Code but also to their share in internal revenue collections in the ARMM as mandated by the organic act of autonomous region. Consequently, the aggregate intergovernmental transfer accruing to ARMM LGUs is more than 20 times that of the regional government itself.
Vertical balance under the Local Government Code. The mismatch between the revenue means and the expenditure needs of various levels of government may be measured by comparing the subnational government's share in general government revenues with its share in general government expenditures (Shah 1994) . Table 23 shows that the vertical fiscal imbalance has worsened at all levels of local government with the implementation of the Local Government Code. Thus, the fiscal deficiency for all LGUs in the aggregate grew from 6.1% in the pre-Code period to 15.6% in the post-Code period. Furthermore, transfers have not been able to fully close the vertical fiscal imbalance in both periods. This is true as well for provinces, cities and municipalities.
Also, while the vertical fiscal imbalance after the IRA was trimmed down to less than 1% in 1999-2000, it has seen surged to 4% in 2001 because of additional unfunded mandates (Table 23 ). This resonates with the widespread perception that a vertical imbalance exists in the sense that the LGUs' prevailing share in national taxes is deficient to cover both the cost of devolved functions and the cost of the so-called unfunded mandates despite the significant increase in the IRA share of LGUs under the Code. These unfunded mandates include the salary increases under the Salary Standardization Law, the additional personnel benefits under the Magna Carta for Health Workers, and the additional number of mandatory positions as well as the sectoral representation mandated under the Local Government Code. A matching of the aggregate IRA levels with LGU expenditure responsibilities (including devolved functions) in 1993 and 1995 shows that while these concerns were not justified in the aggregate in those years, this was not the case in 1996, 1997 and 1998 when the salary adjustments under the Salary Standardization Law were so hefty that the increases in the IRA were not able to keep up with the rising cost of devolved functions and unfunded mandates as well as population growth (Table 24) . 24 However, the analysis also shows that in 1999 and 2000 the natural increase in the IRA arising from the implementation of the Code is now sufficient to cover the adjusted costs of devolved functions and unfunded mandates (Manasan 2001).
Table 24 also shows that in all years in the period 1995-1999 the net resource transfer for all provinces and all municipalities in the aggregate is negative. This implies that increase in the IRA is not sufficient to financed their adjusted cost of devolved functions and unfunded mandates for the said levels of local government. 25 However, the opposite is true for all cities combined. It is easy to see why. 24 The analysis underlying Table 19 is limited by the fact that only the cost of devolved personnel and facilities and the MOOE associated with them were included in the computation. However, there are cases where functions were transferred to LGUs without any corresponding devolution of personnel and facilities from the central government. This is prevalent in the environment and natural resource management and public works arena. Moreover, the cost used in the estimation refer to the cost of the devolved functions as budgeted by the central government prior to devolution and as such they do not necessarily reflect local preferences. 25 The net resource transfer for any given year is computed as the difference between the IRA for said year, on the one hand, and the sum of the adjusted cost of devolved functions, cost of other mandates, and 1992 IRA, on the other hand. Adjustments on the cost side were made to take into account population growth and inflation. Provinces absorbed 37.0% of the total cost of devolved functions, municipalities 38.5%, cities 5.7% and barangays 18.8. 26 Contrast this with the mandated share of LGUs in the IRA: provinces 23 percent, cities 23 percent, municipalities 34 percent and barangays 20 percent and it becomes immediately clear that there is a mismatch in the resources transferred and the expenditure responsibilities devolved to the different levels of local government.
This imbalance may be traced to the fact that the IRA distribution formula was decided much earlier (i.e., during the Congressional debate on RA7160) than the actual assignment of functions (including the devolution of personnel) to different levels of local government. However, some observers note that this skewed distribution may reflect the reality that governors are a more common threat to congressmen than are mayors since the latter either represent congressional districts that are coterminous with the boundaries of a single province or are one of many districts within a single province. While mayors pose similar threats to some congressmen, there are fewer big city mayors than there are governors and most legislators represent districts without highly urbanized cities in them. Thus, by making provinces responsible for more services than they could pay for with automatic revenue transfers, Congress ensured that governors would remain dependent on legislators who could subsequently offer their services as brokers of additional revenues from the center in a personalized manner (Eaton 2000).
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Horizontal Imbalance. In addition to the vertical imbalance across levels of local government, an imbalance also exists across LGUs within each level. Thus, while the increase in the IRA share of some LGUs is not enough to finance the functions devolved to them, others have received resources beyond their requirements. For instance, in 1993, per capita net resource transfer was negative in 37 out the 66 provinces for which data were available.
28 The situation has worsened since then given the enormity of unfunded mandates: Magna Carta for Health Workers, Salary Standardization Law, among others. Thus, in 1998, 65 (82%) out of 78 provinces, 1,336 (87%) out of 1,538 municipalities and 35 (51%) out of 69 cities suffered negative net resource transfers (Table 24) . Clearly, there is a need to improve on the IRA distribution formula so that the expenditure needs of the various levels of local government and the different LGUs within each level are taken into account.
26 Barangays received P1.5 billion in Barangay Administration Fund under the National Assistance to Local Government Units (NALGU) in 1991. This assistance which was used to pay for the salaries of barangay officials was discontinued with the implementation of the Local Government Code and barangays are then expected to pay said salaries out of their own IRA share. 27 When the Code was being debated in Congress, the attitude of congressmen towards decentralization was ambiguous. On the one hand, many of them felt threatened knowing that true local autonomy would reduce their political clout over their respective constituents (who heretofore were largely dependent on projects identified by the congressmen and funded from pork barrel funds) as local government politicians become more empowered with the higher revenue share and expanded expenditure responsibility with fiscal decentralization. On the other hand, many congressmen maintain fraternal relations with local government politicians as Philippine local politics is very much dominated by a small number of families. Thus, it is not uncommon to find cities (or provinces) where the mayor (or governor) is the congressman's wife (or brother/sister/father/son). Thus, in agreeing to decentralize revenues and expenditures, the congressmen then tried to protect against what they feared most about decentralization. 28 Per capita net resource transfer in 1993 is defined as per capita 1993 IRA less per capita 1992 IRA less per capita cost of devolved functions adjusted for inflation)
Impact of Intergovernmental Fiscal Structure on Horizontal Fiscal Balance
In the literature on fiscal decentralization, intergovernmental transfers are generally expected to perform an equalizing role, i.e., help reduce disparities in revenue capacities across levels of local governments and within each level.
The correlation coefficient between per capita IRA of city governments and per capita household income is consistently negative for all years in 1995-2000, suggesting that the IRA distribution formula has had some success in equalizing the fiscal capacities of cities. That is, cities with lower per capita household income tend to receive higher per capita IRA. Nonetheless, the equalizing effect of the IRA in the case of cities is not enough to counteract the large disparities in their tax base. Thus, the sum of per capita own-source revenue of cities and their per capita IRA is found have a positive relationship with per capita household income (Table 25 ).
In contrast, the IRA is found to be counter-equalizing for all years in the case of provinces. On the other hand, the IRA appears to have some equalizing impact on municipalities (aggregated by province) in 1999-2000 but not in 1995-1998 . The difference in the sign of the correlation coefficient between per capita IRA and per capita household income in the years 1995-1998, on the one hand, and the year 1999, on the other, may be due to the implementation of the LGSEF which provided additional transfers to 5 th and 6 th income class municipalities. Note that the LGSEF transfers were treated as part of the IRA in the financial statements of LGUs.
When all
LGUs are aggregated at the provincial level, per capita IRA is found to be positively related to per capita household income in 1995-1999 (Table 25 ). In contrast, in 2000, the correlation coefficient between these two variables is negative indicating that
LGUs with lower per capita household income tend to receive higher per capita IRA. However, even in 2000, the equalizing effect of the IRA is not sufficient to compensate for the inherent disparities in the tax base.
It is also interesting to note that categorical grants did not always result in greater equalization of fiscal capacity in the period under study. In particular, the categorical grants for cities tend to be counter-equalizing in 1996-2000.
Impact of Intergovernmental Fiscal Structure on Revenue Mobilization
This sub-section will look at the incentive effects of intergovernmental transfers on tax effort and local revenue mobilization.
Dis-incentive effect of IRA on own source revenue. Earlier studies shows that while intergovernmental transfers had a neutral effect on local revenue performance in 1985 (prior to the Code), it substituted for local tax revenues in all levels of local governments in 1992 and 1993 (Manasan 1995 . LGUs which were net winners in the fiscal decentralization tended to have lower per capita local tax revenue (as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the product of the dummy variable for the sign of the per capita net resource transfer and per capita IRA in both the real property tax and the local business tax equations of provinces and in real property tax equations of cities). 30 Similarly, the coefficient of per capita IRA itself is negative and statistically significant in the local business tax equation of cities. These findings suggest that LGUs which received higher IRA (whether in absolute terms or relative to their expenditure responsibilities) tended to be lax in their tax effort. Thus, there appears to be a need to alter the IRA distribution formula so as to provide incentives for local tax effort.
As expected, the analysis also shows that per capita local tax revenue is positively and significantly related to per capita household income for both real property tax and local business tax for cities, municipalities and provinces alike in 1995-2000 (Table 26 ). This finding confirms that local tax effort is largely determined by the ability to pay. Given the wide disparities in the distribution of the local tax base across regions, this result further highlights the potential for increased regional inequality with greater fiscal decentralization.
6.
AGENDA FOR REFORM 6.1. Expenditure Assignment.
Overall, the devolution of expenditure responsibilities to subnational governments is consistent with the decentralization theorem. One important exception to the application of this principle in the Philippines is education. Although the construction and maintenance of school buildings was devolved to LGUs under the Code, the primary responsibility for the provision of education remains with the central government. In contrast, the experience in many countries shows that devolving education could possibly improve production efficiency and thus, a review of this specific expenditure assignment may be warranted.
While Section 17 (b) of the Local Government Code provides an unambiguous delineation of functions across levels of governments, Sections 17 (c) on nationally funded devolved activities and Section (f) on national government augmentation of devolved services effectively obfuscating what initially appears to be a clear cut assignment of expenditure responsibilities. 29 Household income data is obtained from the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) of the National Statistics Office. 30 In the regression analysis, a dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 if the LGU had a positive per capita net resource transfer due to the fiscal decentralization (and zero, otherwise) is introduced to check whether net winners behaved differently from the net losers. Note that net resource transfer is defined as the difference between the increment in the IRA and the cost of devolved functions and unfounded mandates. There is need to revisit the LGC 1991 in order to clarify the assignment of expenditure responsibilities across levels of local government. In particular, Section 17 (c) and (f) of the Code has to be re-examined hand in hand with the review of the distribution formula of the IRA. This would require a careful re-assessment of the need for the continued funding of devolved activities by national government agencies as well as LGU budgetary support of local offices (and employees) of many national government agencies. Also, the imposition of unfunded mandates that are not associated with compensating funding transfers to LGUs should be avoided in the future. Also, the devolution of functions from the regional government of the ARMM to ARMM-LGUs should be encouraged.
Three major trends in LGU expenditure are a major source of concern. First, although aggregate LGU spending on the social services sector registered a general upward trend in 1991-2001 when expressed as a percent of GNP and in real per capita terms. However, some stagnation (especially with respect to health expenditures) is evident in 1998-2001 when either of these measures are used. These movements are common across all levels of local government and appear to be related to the fiscal difficulties LGUs faced when their IRA was not released in full in the late 1990s at the same time that they suffered from a decline their own-source revenue. This development is worrisome considering that LGUs are primarily responsible for the delivery of basic health services. It also highlights the need to design grants that will help ensure that
LGUs are able to deliver health and education services that are at least equal to minimum service standards.
Second, LGU spending on transportation and communication contracted from 0.5% of GNP in 1991 to 0.4% of GNP in 2001 despite the devolution of the responsibility for local infrastructure to LGUs. This decline masks even larger reductions in the infrastructure spending of provincial and municipal governments. These developments appear to be link to the mismatch in the distribution of resources and expenditure responsibilities across levels of local governments. Also, given the robust and strong association between economic growth and infrastructure spending, they may be indicative of a widening of the disparities in economic development in across levels of local government. They also underscore the need to strengthen the regulatory framework and arrangements for LGU borrowing and to address the requirement for LGU capital investment financing in the design of intergovernmental transfers .
Third, personal services is the single biggest expenditure item at all levels of local government. While the share of personal services in total LGU expenditure contracted from 45.8% in 1991 to 37.5% in 2001in the case of cities, it expanded from 41.6% to 45.1% in the case of provinces and from 46.1% to 55.3% in the case of municipalities. Because of these developments, there has been a squeeze on the capital outlays of provinces and both MOOE and capital outlays of municipalities.
In this regard, there is a need to re-assess the compensation and position classification system as well as the list of mandatory LGU positions provided for in the Local Government Code in order to give LGUs more leeway in adjusting their PS expenditures. Also, a review of the cap on PS expenditures is in order. Existing practices and procedures that allow LGUs to comply with this requirement do not appear to be helpful in enabling LGUs to effectively control their PS spending.
Tax Assignment
The current tax assignment does not fare well in terms of the autonomy criterion. While the Local Government Code authorizes LGUs to levy a good number of taxes, the more revenue productive taxes are retained by the central government even as the Code seriously constrain the power of LGUs to set local tax rates. Thus, the link between LGU spending responsibilities and their taxing powers is weak.
Given this background, future Code amendments should focus on promoting greater tax decentralization. In particular, said amendments should give LGUs greater discretion in setting tax rates by (1) raising the maximum allowable tax rates, (2) allowing
LGUs to adjust the tax rates more frequently, and (3) relaxing the restrictions on the size of the tax rate adjustments that they are authorized to make. More importantly, LGUs should be allowed to impose a surcharge (i.e., piggyback) on some of the central government taxes (possibly, the individual income tax).
Also, the tax structure prescribed by the Code for the local business tax should be simplified so as to ease up tax administration and improve taxpayer compliance. At the same time, support for greater computerization and capacity building for the staff of the tax division is critical.
Finally, the conduct of the general revision of the schedule of market values of real property may be de-politicize by lodging this activity with the central government. Such a move will not reduce the autonomy of LGUs provided they retain, if not increase, their control over local tax rates and assessment levels.
Intergovernmental Transfers
As in other countries, LGUs in the aggregate in the Philippines suffer a vertical fiscal gap. Many types of taxes are either easier to administer at the central level or are deemed to be unsuitable for local sub-national government imposition because their tax bases are geographically mobile. On the other hand, the principle of subsidiarity implies that many functions are best assigned to local governments. To a large extent, this gap is addressed by intergovernmental transfers (specifically the IRA) and LGUs have been clamoring to increase the size of the IRA pool.
Also, as indicated above, there is a mismatch between the assignment of revenues (local taxes plus IRA) and the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to the different levels of local government. The share of provinces and municipalities in total LGU ownsource revenue declines in the post-Code period despite their large share in the cost of devolved functions.
In this context, there is a need to re-assess the tax and expenditure assignment across different levels of local government. At the same time, the vertical imbalance should be primarily be addressed through greater tax decentralization -the assignment of more tax bases to LGUs. Consequently, intergovernmental transfers would then be redesigned to address help close the disparities in the fiscal capacities of LGUs as well as to ensure that LGUs get the appropriate financing for them to achieve minimum service standards for key basic social services. 
